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Existing processes and methods for incident handling are geared towards infrastructures and operational models that will be
increasingly outdated by cloud computing. Research has shown that to adapt incident handling to cloud computing environments,
cloud customers must establish clarity about their requirements on Cloud Service Providers (CSPs) for successful handling of
incidents and contract CSPs accordingly. Secondly, CSPs must strive to support these requirements and mirror them in their
Service Level Agreements. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) have been used widely to detect malicious behaviors in network
communication and hosts. Facing new application scenarios in Cloud Computing, the IDS approaches yield several problems since
the operator of the IDS should be the user, not the administrator of the Cloud infrastructure. Cloud providers need to enable
possibilities to deploy and configure IDS for the user - which poses its own challenges. Current research and commercial solutions
primarily focus on protecting against Denial of Service attacks and attacks against the Cloud’s virtual infrastructure. To counter
these challenges, we propose a capability that aims to both detect and prevent the potential of data exfiltration by using a novel
deception-based methodology. We also introduce a method of increasing the data protection level based on various threat conditions.
Index Terms—Cyber Deception, Intrusion Detection, Cloud Storage Provider.
I. INTRODUCTION
ACCORDING to [1], security incident handling, an inte-gral part of security management, treats detection and
analysis of security incidents as well as the subsequent re-
sponse activities (i.e., containment, eradication, and recovery)
as outlined below:
• Detection: Discover indicators of possible security inci-
dents
• Analysis: Ascertain that indeed a security incident is
at hand and understand what exactly has happened/is
happening
• Containment: Contain the incident before it spreads and
overwhelms resources or increases damage
• Eradication and Recovery Eliminate system changes
caused by the incident and recover normal operations
• Preparation and Continuous Improvement: Set up/adapt
incident handling activities according to changing re-
quirements and system/threat landscape.
Existing processes and methods for incident handling are
geared towards infrastructures and operational models that will
be increasingly outdated by cloud computing. Research has
shown that to adapt incident handling to cloud computing en-
vironments, cloud customers must establish clarity about their
requirements on Cloud Service Providers (CSPs) for success-
ful handling of incidents and contract CSPs accordingly. Sec-
ondly, CSPs must strive to support these requirements and mir-
ror them in their Service Level Agreements. Typically, security
incidents will cross the boundaries of both customer and CSP
in each of the common deployment models (i.e., Software-as-
a-service, Platform-as-a-service and Infrastructure-as-a-service
or Saas, Paas, and IaaS respectively) denoting both joint
responsibility and access. This must be taken into account
when setting up incident handling or prevention for a cloud
infrastructure. Our research focuses on attacks confined to the
SaaS deployment model due to the limited level of control a
user has over the security of their data once it is stored within
the cloud.
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) have been used widely
to detect malicious behaviors in network communication and
hosts. IDS management is an important capability for dis-
tributed IDS solutions, which makes it possible to integrate
and handle different types of sensors or collect and synthesize
alerts generated from multiple hosts located in the distributed
environment. Facing new application scenarios in Cloud Com-
puting, the IDS approaches yield several problems since the
operator of the IDS should be the user, not the administrator of
the Cloud infrastructure. Extensibility, efficient management,
and compatibility to virtualization-based context need to be
introduced into many existing IDS implementations. Addition-
ally, the Cloud providers need to enable possibilities to deploy
and configure IDS for the user. To date, a number of theoretical
frameworks have been proposed to address these concerns. [2],
[3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15],
[16], [17]. None, however, have been implemented in practice,
hence, the concepts that are presented cannot be effectively
validated. Other research focuses on protecting the Virtual
Machine (VM) within the cloud infrastructure from attacks
- primarily focused on monitoring VM resources to maximize
utilization or prevent Denial of Service attacks. [18], [19], [20],
[21], [22], [23], [24], [25], [26], [27].
One major gap identified in our assessment of the current
state of affairs in applying IDS concepts in a Public cloud
setting is data exfiltration detection and prevention. Data
exfiltration is defined as the unauthorized transfer of data
from a computer. To address this particular gap, we propose
a novel method for detecting and preventing data exfiltration
using cyber deception [28]. According to [28], cyber deception
is a deliberate act to conceal activity on a network, create
uncertainty and confusion against an adversary’s efforts to
establish situational awareness and to influence and misdirect
adversary perceptions and decision processes. To accomplish
this, we focus on the Detection and Containment aspects of
the incident handling process. In the case of our research,
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2containment refers to the efforts aimed at preventing the
exfiltration from occurring - not preventing the spread of a
cyber infection (e.g., worm or other malware). Our approach
is implemented such that cloud users do not have to rely
on the protection mechanisms offered by the Cloud Storage
Provider (CSP) which are often limited to common Data Loss
Prevention techniques - which operate based on pre-defined
policies. The limitations of these approaches include: 1) can
be bypassed by the use of encryption 2) are also under the
control of the CSP (client-side or server-side) and 3) are not
designed to prevent against unknown attacks (i.e., that are not
specified in the deployed policy). To address these and other
limitations we propose the following contributions:
• A novel data anonymization technique using format-
preserving encryption for producing deception file objects
based on input data
• The design of a novel capability to detect data exfiltration
attempts in Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) cloud storage
providers without having to rely on the provider or a
middleware vendor using cyber deception.
• The design of a novel data protection mechanism that
adjusts protection level based on threat conditions.
• A proposed prototype implementation (future work sec-
tion) of our design across several popular cloud storage
vendors to show its viability in a number of cloud settings
The presented approach is not designed to replace existing
solutions, but provide a mechanism that increases the Defense
in Depth of data within a SaaS cloud environment. The rest
of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a
background of the threat space we address with this work and
presents related research, Section 3 describes the design of
a proposed Cloud Storage Environment that is protected via
Cyber Deception concepts, Sections 4 concludes the paper, and
Section 5 provides areas for future work - primarily focusing
on a prototype implementation across multiple Cloud Storage
Providers.
II. BACKGROUND
As mentioned above, existing research largely has focused
on the protection on Virtual Machines within Cloud infras-
tructures as well as on proposing frameworks that would aid
in the detection/protection of data within the cloud. None of
the aforementioned methods resulted in implementations that
could be used by the public to protect data in SaaS storage
infrastructures. The following research outlines a variety of
methods attempting to remedy this. One common weakness
with those discussed below is that the user is not in control of
the protection mechanisms applied to their data. Hence, they
have to trust that 1) the protections offered are adequate, 2)
the audit information is accurate, and 3) the protections will
not fail in the event of adversarial compromise.
A. Threat Model
When user data is stored in a Software as a Service (SaaS)
Public Cloud setting, it is subject to the security features
provisioned by the CSP. As mentioned above, this leads to
a number of threats that user’s data can be subject to without
their knowledge or control. We focus our efforts on the
methods by which sensitive data can be exfiltrated once it has
been transferred to the cloud. Our research does not examine
uploads for policy conformance. We focus specifically on
data that is resident on the cloud - as we assume that users
have followed any relevant policy that governs the storage
of data in the cloud. Within the cloud, there are 3 primary
ways data can be accessed and hence subsequently exfiltrated:
1) Via Sharing (individual or group), 2) Via download (web
interface or client application), and 3) Via the cloud interface
(within the cloud environment). Our research focuses on the
detecting and prevention of data exfiltration via sharing and
download requests. As previously stated, SaaS environments
are not under the control of the user - hence we cannot
modify the cloud infrastructure to monitor accesses within the
environment itself. An additional feature we provide is the
ability to be aware of varying threat conditions - providing a
higher level of protection when the adversarial threat is at its
peak.
Within the cloud setting, data exfiltration can be prevented
via the following methods: 1) Detect an attempt and pre-
vent it before it happens - would require the monitoring all
potential paths of theft in cloud and intercepting malicious
looking attempts, 2) Allow/Disallow information from being
downloaded based on individual or organizational policies
(after data is stored), or 3) Allow access to information in
cloud only when given permission or authorization. In the
SaaS deployment model, method 1 is not possible without the
modification of the Cloud infrastructure. Method 2 focuses on
protecting information from being exfiltrated via the Cloud
- not after the information is stored. This has also been
addressed by CloudFilter (a paper we discuss below). We
aim to control data exfiltration via the 3rd method to prevent
attempts by malicious adversaries who have compromised
a user account [30]. We assume that users are generally
trustworthy (i.e., not malicious insiders) and are able to make
wise decisions about who needs to have access to their data
- prior to it being uploaded. Our approach can be used as an
alternative or augment to client-side encryption cloud storage
vendors that offer a method of protecting user data from the
cloud provider themselves.
B. Related Work
1) Cyber Deception:
The art of deception has been used as a technique to lure
attackers away from important data and learn about their
techniques and targets[35], [43]. In the space of cloud data
protection, two methods have been proposed: Fog Computing
and a Honeypot implementation for the cloud. In [31], the
authors propose a novel deception-based concept that focuses
on the protection of insider data theft attacks by monitoring
data access in the cloud and detecting abnormal access pat-
terns. They accomplish this by profiling the normal behavior of
users and upon the detection of an anomaly, they produce and
return decoy information (e.g. docs, honey files, honeypots) to
the attacker. Being that there is no implementation in an actual
cloud environment, it is difficult to ascertain the viability of
3their approach due to the fact that quantifying normal user
behaviors is a difficult problem[44] - in general - and much
more in a cloud computing environment that is largely multi-
tenant. Other approaches [32], [33] attempt to apply anomaly-
based detection mechanisms to the cloud but suffer from the
same issues- profiling users in such a complex environment
and not being implemented in an actual cloud environment.
Similarly, [34] aims to employ deception concepts in a
private cloud using a honeypot. The authors deploy the Snort
Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) in the Eucalyptus
private cloud as a proof of concept implementation. They
incorporate a honeypot into the NIDS to further entice at-
tackers and provide a mechanism to learn more about similar
future attacks. The primary weaknesses of their approach
is that 1) it would require a major modification to existing
cloud infrastructures to implement their methodologies, 2) it
uses a signature-based approach for detection, and 3) their
deployment would require awareness of Cloud infrastructure
to enable full OS coverage (e.g. Windows, Linux, OS X).
Neither the Fog Computing, Honeypot, or Anomaly-Based
approaches as described would be feasible in practice due to
these limitations. Our proposed solution extends the concepts
present within Fog Computing by providing an implementation
in an actual cloud storage environment, providing a novel
mechanism for users to generate decoy information that is
derived from their uploaded files, and focusing specifically on
data exfiltration problem. Additionally we provide a mech-
anism that can adjust to current threat conditions as we
subsequently discuss.
Commercial Cloud Providers: There are a number of
Commercial Cloud
Providers that provide features to protect the security of cloud
user data. The primary security features they all provide are:
the protection of data in transit and data at rest and two-
factor authentication. Other than Box, they all offer limited
oversight of the activities associated with files/folders. Within
Dropbox, the event log tracks when users create, delete, and
restore Dropbox folders. Once an action is taken, the event log
records the name and ID of the Dropbox folder, the action, the
user who made the change, and the date it was performed [36].
For Google Drive, the types of file activities that are recorded
are the: 1) moving and removing, 2) renaming, 3) uploading,
4) sharing and unsharing, and 5) editing and commenting.
There are no specific additional security features provided
in the documentation [37]. SugarSync1 monitors any edits to
a file, any new files created, files deleted, and changes to a
folder or sub-folders [38]. Box [39] offers the most advanced
native security features of all the existing CSPs (to include the
ones described above). Box provides comprehensive reporting,
logging, and audit trails in order to track account activity, file
access, settings changes and nearly everything else that occurs
in Box.
These features allow users to monitor for access violations
only, but are not combined with a mechanism to prevent data
loss. Box, however, does provide a separate mechanisms to
detect and prevent data loss via extended security policies that
1www.sugarsync.com
allows users to keep content confidential, mitigate data loss,
flag risky sharing requests, and white list certain domains that
should be trusted. Some native features are present, but others
are offered via collaborative security partners. CipherCloud
(one such partner) offers of a secure middleware service that
provides users with insight into cloud data [38]. They provide
a range of features to include: 1) User activity monitoring,
2) Anomaly Detection, 3) Comprehensive Audit Logs, and 4)
Ongoing Data Loss Prevention Monitoring. This solution has a
number of promising features, however, these all require trust
of an entity like CipherCloud with their data (risk transference)
and it also comes at a premium cost and is geared towards
organizations - not individual users.
CSP IDS Implementations: In[40], Greg Roth and Don
Bailey present a detailed overview of Amazon Web Services
(AWS) Intrusion Detection capabilities. These capabilities are
a combination of several features: AWS’s Identity and Access
Management, Multi-Factor Authentication, Amazon S3 Bucket
Logging, Security Audit Role, Write Once Storage for Data
Provenance (Versioning), and Auditing Logs. Their approach
is to use this compendium of features to detect unauthorized
access to user data based on user roles. The major weakness of
this role-based approach is that it is a script based IDS, not an
actual system that the general user can use. Another weakness
is dynamically adjusting to changing roles may be difficult
to capture and categorizing employee’s using clear cut roles
may be difficult to define. Due to the number of components
involved, it would require a security expert to setup, configure,
and interpret the resulting alerts. It is limited in scope -
focusing primarily on access permission violations not specific
attack types (e.g., data exfiltration, integrity breaches) and is
specific to Amazon EC2, hence, not interoperable with other
CSP infrastructures.
Lastly, in [41], Ioannis and Pietzuch describe CloudFilter -
a system for the practical control of sensitive data propagation
to the cloud. Their scheme monitors HTTP File Transfers to
the Cloud independent of the CSP being used. Upon upload of
each user file or files, CloudFilter enforces data propagation
policies to confirm that the upload request is authorized. Their
approach is limited to just monitoring the HTTP protocol
which would cause CloudFilter to miss sensitive data being
propagating via another protocol. One major strength of the
described approach is that no modification is necessary to the
CSP infrastructure, however, it does require modification of
files upon upload and web browsers for user identification.
This solution does not address data exfiltration once it is
resident within the cloud, because it only monitors uploads.
III. PROTOTYPE DESIGN
The goal of our prototype is to provide a transparent
and practical solution for protecting sensitive data stored in
Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) Cloud Storage Provider, which
represent stored data as files. An important requirement is
for the system to be applicable across different cloud storage
providers with minimal end-user configuration. We accomplish
this by leveraging a cloud agnostic API (discussed in next
section) to avoid having to adapt to the API of specific cloud
4storage service. Secondly, the deceptive information should
be automatically generated based on the input provided to
accompany the files that are uploaded. Lastly, we provide
a solution that can be employed in a representative scenario
based on the criticality of the cyber situation and/or INFOCON
status. We accomplish this without modification of the cloud
infrastructure. Our prototype provides the following compo-
nent engines all integrated with a cloud storage provider:
• Generation engine that produces deceptive Objects or
Decoy Documents with high similarity to original content
• Detection engine that monitors access requests and ver-
ifies originating source.
• Prevention engine that controls access to legitimate
documents via deception-based cloud access layer
• Threat engine that makes adjustment of deception-based
protection “level” based on varying threat conditions
(e.g., INFOCON Level)
Below we walk through a exfiltration attempt against our
framework. There are several steps that take place between
a user (or enterprise) and a cloud provider during an upload
operation. Prior to step 1, the initial threat level is set to
INFOCON Level 5 - indicating the lowest threat environment.
In step 1, a user submits a file via our prototype application
and several host system identifiers are embedded within the
file to include: Computer MAC Address, Network IP Address,
Network Hostname, UserID, and Hash of 4-tuple identifiers
(MAC, IP, Hostname, UserID). In step 2, the file is read and
each numerical data element of the file is anonymized - creat-
ing the decoy document. Sensitive data within a file is usually
represented as numerical data (e.g., SSN, Credit Card), but can
also be represented as names such as locations and people.
Numerical data can be recognized using regular expressions.
Name data can be recognized using Natural Language Process-
ing techniques such as Named Entity Recognition[45]. Once
identified, sensitive data can be changed to a random value
or to a more strategic value using look up tables and online
searches depending on the level of security necessary. Step 3
results in both the decoy document and the original document
being uploaded and stored in the cloud. Steps 1-3 represent
how a file is uploaded to the cloud. Once the file is uploaded, it
persists on the cloud as any other file uploaded. Next, assume
some time as passed since the files were uploaded to the
cloud. Step 4 represents a request(s) for a particular file stored
within the cloud. Lastly, step 5 commences the monitoring
process for exfiltration attempts and threat level updates. Steps
4-5 represent an exfiltration attempt on some file. Figure 1
provides an illustration of our prototype architecture.
A few foundational concepts in cyber deception have pre-
ceded our design and subsequent implementation - which we
outline here for context. Honeyfiles are bait files intended for
hackers to access. The files reside on a file server, and the
server sends an alarm when a honeyfile is accessed [46]. In
[47], Wang et. al. add honey activity to enhance the realism of
honeyfiles. The Decoy Document Distributor (D3) System is a
tool for generating and monitoring decoys. An accompanying
website (FOG) allows users to download files, such as tax
documents and receipts, that appear authentic but actually
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Fig. 1: Proposed Prototype Architecture: Prior to entering
deceptive file editing, INFOCON Level is set. 1) A file is
submitted and host system identifiers are embedded in the file
2) Files are deceptively modified 3) Upload and store original
and decoy document to cloud 4) A file within the cloud is
access 5) Monitor exfil attempt(s) for a particular file
contain spurious information [48]. Lastly, Fox provides a
mechanism for placing decoy documents in places that are
more likely to get accessed [49]. As previously stated, there
has been much previous work in the area of using deceptive
data to defend against malicious adversaries. Yet no prior
work has attempted to adapt these concepts in a SaaS cloud
storage environment - which is out of the control of a user.
Secondly, no work has been proposed that provides the ability
to adjust to varying threat situations (e.g. INFOCON levels).
Additionally, we address the specific threat of data exfiltration
in SaaS storage environments. Lastly, our approach uses pre-
existing content to generate deception data whereas previous
work focuses on generating data based on sensitive properties.
For decoy object generation, we follow a different pro-
cess than is used to generate a honeyfile, where users are
responsible for selecting the honeyfiles in their environment.
In our scheme, we rely on data within each file to generate
a replica highly similar to original content. Creating simi-
lar documents can influence an attacker’s decision making.
Not knowing which document is the original and therefore
what content is legitimate can force them to make incorrect
decisions and potentially critical errors. Creating a higher
ratio of replica to original files makes the this technique
probabilistic in that the ability of an attacker to guess the
correct file if inversely related to the number of replica files.
For the generation process, each file is tokenized (primary
delimiter would be spaces) into individual words and the
word structure examined to determine its sensitivity. We make
a simple assumption that sensitive content will likely take
a numerical format (not including alphanumeric characters).
Hence, if a word is determined to be sensitive it is converted
using format-preserving encryption. In cryptography, format-
preserving encryption (FPE) refers to encrypting in such a way
that the output (the ciphertext) is in the same format as the
input (the plaintext) [50]. Upon completion of the document
analysis process, the decoy document will be created. The
naming convention for the decoy document will be similar to
the original to ensure plausibility.
5As previously stated, there are several ways that data can
be exfiltrated via the cloud: Downloading, Sharing, or Cloud
Access. To adequately detect and prevent exfiltration through
these channels, we provide a system that monitors all requests
to information residing on a cloud storage provider’s infras-
tructure from a host system. We are unable to monitor access
requests originating from the Cloud Provider itself to the
design of SaaS environments. Hence, we focus on Download
and Sharing operations. Whenever a download or sharing
request is made, the default identifier (e.g. host MAC address)
is used to confirm the legitimacy of the request. We use the
MAC address because it is unique to each machine. Though
it can be spoofed, it is a metric that we have access to that
is unique to each machine2. If the originating host identifier
matches the embedded identifier within the file, the actual file
is returned to requesting party. Otherwise the corresponding
decoy document is returned and the event is logged. Increasing
levels of protection are imposed as the threat level increases
as will be discussed below.
Cyber threats commonly change over time within a partic-
ular environment. We argue that this is also the case within
a cloud storage environment. Hence, a solution presented to
protect data within that environment, should be able to adapt to
the ebb and flow of the threat landscape. Hence our approach
proposes an emulated threat environment that mirrors the IN-
FOCON levels 3 used by the US government to designate the
presence of a hostile threat. With each threat level increase, our
approach requires additional system identifiers to validate an
access request. We describe the U.S. government INFOCON
levels below:
• INFOCON 5 describes a situation where there is no
apparent hostile activity against computer networks. Op-
erational performance of all information systems is mon-
itored, and password systems are used as a layer of
protection.
• INFOCON 4 describes an increased risk of attack. In-
creased monitoring of all network activities is mandated,
and all Department of Defense (DoD) end users must
make sure their systems are secure. Internet usage may
be restricted to government sites only, and backing up
files to removable media is ideal.
• INFOCON 3 describes when a risk has been identified.
Security review on important systems is a priority, and
the Computer Network Defense system’s alertness is
increased. All unclassified dial-up connections are dis-
connected.
• INFOCON 2 describes when an attack has taken place
but the Computer Network Defense system is not at its
highest alertness. Non-essential networks may be taken
offline, and alternate methods of communication may be
implemented.
2Ideally, a value that is unique to every machine and stored in a secure
location on the device (e.g. a value created and stored on the Trusted Platform
Module[51]) should be used.
3Strategic Command Directive (SD) 527-1 (2006-01-27). ”Department
of Defense (DOD) Information Operations Condition (INFOCON) System
Procedures” (PDF). DISA Policy and Guidance. Retrieved 2016-04-03.
• INFOCON 1 describes when attacks are taking place and
the Computer Network Defense system is at maximum
alertness. Any compromised systems are isolated from
the rest of the network.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed several methods to address
the problem of data exfiltration detection and prevention in a
SaaS Cloud Storage environment. Our proposed methods will
overcome the limitations of existing approaches that primarily
focus on the protection of the virtual infrastructure - not
the data that is stored in these environments. We leverage
a number of concepts in cyber deception for data protection
and introduce the ability to adapt to varying threat conditions.
Data Loss Prevention (DLP) is often implemented within a
cloud storage environment to protect against data exfiltration.
However, we found that DLP has a number of shortfalls to
include: 1) can be bypassed by the use of encryption 2) are
also under the control of the CSP and 3) are not designed to
prevent against unknown attacks. As a result, we demonstrate
the added value of using decoy documents within a SaaS
environment for more dynamic data protection. We provide a
prototype implementation that interoperates with a number of
popular cloud storage providers and offer supporting analysis
results.
V. FUTURE WORK
In future work, we will provide a prototype implementation
of the design in section 3. The goal of our prototype implemen-
tation will be to demonstrate the viability of our solution across
a number of different Cloud Storage Providers (CSPs). We will
present implementations for Dropbox4, Google Drive5, and
Box6 CSPs. We will leverage a number of 3rd party APIs to
enable the key features for our prototype: kloudless, Extensible
Metadata Platform (XMP) toolkit, and libffx. For each CSP,
the implementation focus will be on 1) Generation of Decoy
Documents, 2) Detection and Prevention of Data Exfiltration
Attacks, 3) Adjusting the Protection Levels Based on Threat
Conditions.
Addtionally, we plan to integrate several threat database
sources to provide higher fidelity information prior to making
a data protection adjustment (e.g. threatconnect, threatscape,
enigmadatabase). Additionally, we will identify other actions
that could be taken upon notification of an increased threat
level (e.g., increase the ratio of decoy objects in the environ-
ment or impose a data access timeout period). As a proof of
concept, we focused on the action that was most effective in
defending against data exfiltration attempts. Addressing other
stages within the cyber kill chain model would be a natural
evolution of our concepts. The goal would be to address
different aspects of the user experience in the cloud (from
a security perspective) with various cyber deception artifacts.
In this work we have implicitly focused on mitigating the
‘action on objectives’ stage of the kill chain process - the last
4www.dropbox.com
5www.google.com/drive/
6www.box.com
6phase of the kill chain. Future work would seek to address
the Reconnaissance, Weaponization, Delivery, Exploitation,
Installation, and Command & Control phases.
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